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Abstract. This article links the consequences of the Great Recession on protest and electoral politics. It
innovates by combining the literature on economic voting with social movement research and by presenting
the first integrated, large-scale empirical analysis of protest mobilisation and electoral outcomes in Europe.
The economic voting literature offers important insights on how and under what conditions economic
crises play out in the short-run. However, it tends to ignore the closely connected dynamics of opposition
in the two arenas and the role of protests in politicising economic grievances. More specifically, it is
argued that economic protests act as a ‘signalling mechanism’ by attributing blame to decision makers and
by highlighting the political dimension of deteriorating economic conditions. Ultimately, massive protest
mobilisation should, thus, amplify the impact of economic hardship on the electoral losses of incumbents
and mainstream parties more generally. The empirical analysis to study this relationship relies on an original
semi-automated protest event dataset combined with an updated dataset of electoral outcomes in 30
European countries from 2000 to 2015. The results indicate that the dynamics of economic protests and
electoral punishment are closely related and point to a destabilisation of European party systems during the
Great Recession.
Keywords: protest politics; protest event analysis; economic crisis; electoral politics; economic voting;
mainstream parties
Introduction
Almost all European economies contracted in the first storm of the Great Recession,
which hit the continent after the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers in the
autumn of 2008. Most economies recovered fairly quickly after the first ‘shock’, but the
financial crisis soon developed into the so-called ‘Euro Crisis’. The countries in Southern
Europe especially have been caught in a spiral of stagnation, high unemployment and
public debt ever since.Ultimately, several crisis-ridden countries needed financial assistance
and had to accept strong conditions by their international creditors. Cumulative research
documents the political consequences of this crisis in Europe. Importantly, studying the link
between economic grievances and political responses has been revived.Among others, social
movement studies have examined the wave of anti-austerity protests and reconsidered the
link between economic strains and protest mobilisation (e.g.,Beissinger & Sasse 2014;Della
Porta 2015;Grasso & Giugni 2016; Klandermans & Van Stekelenburg 2016;Quaranta 2016;
Kurer et al. 2018), while electoral and party scholars have studied the massive punishment
of incumbents and, in some cases, the breakdown of entire party systems and established
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lines of conflict (e.g., Bartels 2014; Costa Lobo & Lewis-Beck 2017; Hobolt & Tilley 2016;
Hooghe & Marks 2018; Hutter & Kriesi 2019; Otjes & Katsanidou 2017).
However, the literature still lacks a systematic and large-scale comparative analysis that
connects the political responses to theGreat Recession in the electoral and the protest arena.
As McAdam and Tarrow (2010, 2013) and Hutter (2014) have argued, the bifurcation of
scholarly work on social movements and protest, on the one side, and political parties and
elections, on the other, has hampered our understanding of the dynamics of political conflict
in contemporary democracies. This is unsatisfactory as the Great Recession has yet again
offered multiple examples of the manifold connections and interactions. As exemplified by
the recent protest wave and the rise of so-called ‘movement parties’ from both the left and
right (e.g.,Altiparmakis & Lorenzini 2018;Della Porta et al. 2017), the dynamic interactions
of protest and electoral politics may trigger profound changes. Such reinforcing spirals of
movement and party mobilisation tend to be most likely in a context of shifting alignment
in times of economic and political crises (e.g., Hutter et al. 2019; Roberts 2017).
To advance our understanding of aggregate links between economic grievances, electoral
and protest politics, we build upon and refine the economic voting framework (e.g., Duch &
Stevenson 2008;Lewis-Beck& Stegmaier 2007). Specifically,we ask the following questions.
Have the changing economic conditions during the Great Recession affected European
protest politics in the same way and with the same intensity as electoral politics? And to
what extent has protest mobilisation in the streets contributed to the massive electoral
punishment of parties in times of economic crisis?
To answer these questions, we proceed in two steps. First, we borrow arguments from
the economic voting literature on the conditional effects of macroeconomic factors on
electoral punishment and test whether they also apply to the level of economic protest in
a given society (this is our ‘equivalence hypothesis’). We bring in research on economic
voting because social movement studies have for a long time neglected the role of objective
economic grievances (e.g., Buechler 2004) and lack equally established theoretical and
empirical claims on the link between the economy and political protest.
Second, we aim to enrich the economic voting literature by introducing protest as
a thus far neglected condition that may influence the extent of the economic vote. We
start out from McAdam and Tarrow’s (2010, 2013) insight that even if there are no
opportunities for immediate electoral punishment, the electoral cycle is embedded in an
ongoing process of political mobilisation that interacts with elections in complex ways.
More precisely, we emphasise the role of protests in politicising grievances. We argue that
protests may act as a ‘signalling mechanism’ by attributing blame to decision makers and
by highlighting the political dimension of deteriorating economic conditions (‘signalling
hypothesis’).Ultimately,we do not expect a direct effect of protest on electoral punishment;
rather,massive protests should amplify the impact of economic hardship on electoral losses
of incumbents and mainstream parties more generally (‘destabilisation hypothesis’).
Overall, the study innovates by connecting social movement research with the economic
voting literature, suggesting a mechanism through which protest may contribute to the
further destabilisation of European party systems, and testing the plausibility of these
arguments based on the first analysis of aggregate shifts in protest mobilisation and electoral
outcomes across a large set of European democracies. Specifically, the empirical analysis
C© 2019 European Consortium for Political Research
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combines original protest event data with data on electoral outcomes in 30 European
countries from 2000 to 2015.1
Theoretical framework and expectations
Borrowing insights from the economic voting literature to study protest politics
Social movement studies have neglected the role of objective economic conditions as an
explanatory factor for increasing or declining protest levels for several decades.Based on the
famous dictum of McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1215) that ‘there is always enough discontent
in any society to support the grassroots supply for a movement’, the field rather focused
on the role of organisations, the political context and discursive strategies to mobilise
discontent in society (Buechler 2004). While (relative) economic grievances made their
way back into social movement studies in the Great Recession (e.g., Beissinger & Sasse
2014; Della Porta 2015; Grasso & Giugni 2016; Quaranta 2016; Kurer et al. 2018), the field
still tends to lack a set of well-established arguments and findings on the relation between
economic performance and aggregate protest levels. That is why in this article we resort to
the economic voting framework.
The raison d’être of the economic voting literature is exactly the search for relations
between economic indicators and political behaviour. It assumes instrumentally rational
voters, who will reward the incumbents with their vote when the economy is good and
punish them when the economy is bad.Much of the literature conceives of economic voting
as any change in the support for the chief executive, but some research also focuses on
changes in support for the government coalition. According to most studies, it is not the
personal financial situation that is decisive for the economic vote but the perception of
the national economy (e.g., Duch & Stevenson 2008; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2007). The
literature thus shows that voting depends on the economic context and that economic voting
is pervasive both in ‘normal’ and ‘crisis’ periods. Increasing work also documents how
strongly incumbents were punished in the Great Recession and that the punishment varies
in line with the predictions of the economic voting literature – that is, according to how hard
the economic crisis hit individual countries (e.g., Bartels 2014; Hernández & Kriesi 2016;
Talving 2018).
Furthermore, the literature on economic voting shows that the effects are conditioned
by the political context. Three points are particularly important: First, Powell and Whitten’s
(1993) landmark study has documented for the first time that the clarity of political
responsibility conditions economic voting: the voters’ assessment of the government’s
economic performance plays a more decisive role if the national institutional context
allows the voters to clearly attribute the responsibility for the economic performance to
the government. Duch and Stevenson’s (2008) much more detailed results confirm this
evidence. Second, recent work also documents important differences depending on the
institutionalisation of the party system (e.g., Hernández & Kriesi 2016) – that is, economic
voting presupposes a certain degree of structured and long-term interactions of the parties
in a given system. In our sample, this mainly differentiates the party systems in Western and
Eastern Europe. Measured against several criteria, the latter are far less institutionalised
(Casal Bértoa 2014), and as Neff Powell and Tucker (2013) show, the high level of volatility
C© 2019 European Consortium for Political Research
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in these systems since the democratic transition has above all been due to the entry and
exit of parties. Finally, research in the economic voting tradition has documented that, in
times of increasing globalisation,voters are less likely to punish national governments in bad
economic times because they perceive the constraints of national governments’ influence on
economic developments (e.g., Hellwig & Samuels 2007; Costa Lobo & Lewis-Beck 2017).
As the current economic crisis brought to the fore the strong economic and political
interdependencies in Europe, the previous arguments would lead us to expect that the
impact of economic conditions on the punishment of incumbents should be weaker – or
at least not stronger – in the Great Recession. This is also what some empirical studies
show (e.g., Magalhães 2014; Talving 2018). However, other scholars in the economic voting
field suggest being cautious here. For example, Costa Lobo and Lewis-Beck (2017: 616ff)
emphasise that some of the negative findingsmight simply bemethodological artifacts – that
is, studies based on individual-level cross-sectional data are not able to grasp the effects of
the economic vote because of restricted variance. In a context of a profound economic crisis,
a large part of society – regardless of partisan attachments – acknowledges the economic
problems.2
There is yet another reason for why scholars might have found differing results of
the crisis on the economic vote in the Great Recession – namely timing (Hernández &
Kriesi 2016). The current economic crisis unfolded in stages: while the initial economic
shock affected almost all European countries, the economic prospects of most, but not all,
improved fairly quickly thereafter.The voters in the countries where the economy continued
to stagnate or even experienced a pronounced double-dip recession are, therefore, likely
to have perceived the incumbents’ failure as particularly serious, not only compared to the
pre-2008 situation but also compared to other countries (on benchmarking, see Kayser &
Peress 2012).
Taking these insights from research on economic voting and benchmarking as our
starting point, we test whether the same dynamics are at play when looking at the ups and
downs of protests over economic issues.As Piven andCloward (1977: 15) have already noted
a long time ago, ‘ordinarily, defiance is first expressed in the voting booth simply because,
whether defiant or not, people have been socialized within a political culture that defines
voting as the mechanism through which political change can and should properly occur’.
Accordingly, the first signs of popular discontent are sharp shifts in voting patterns.However,
as highlighted before, the movement literature also emphasises that, in the absence of
immediately available options in institutionalised arenas, discontented groups are likely
to resort to the protest arena and try to force concessions from political elites by directly
appealing to the public. In other words, we expect that protest mobilisation related to
economic matters should also be driven by bad economic performance, especially in later
stages of the crisis and under ‘favourable’ political conditions, such as clarity of responsibility
and high party system institutionalisation (this is our ‘equivalence hypothesis’).
Enriching the economic voting literature: The signalling function of protest politics
In addition to establishing whether the same economic and political factors drive the
ups and downs in protest politics as in electoral politics, we shall focus on the questions
of whether and how protests might have aggravated electoral losses of incumbents in
C© 2019 European Consortium for Political Research
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the Great Recession. More specifically, we emphasise the role of protest as a ‘signalling
mechanism’ that attributes blame to decision makers and highlights the political dimension
of deteriorating economic conditions (see Lohmann 1993).
Regarding the dynamics of electoral and protest politics, we build on Schattschneider’s
(1960) idea of the ‘expansion of conflict’. According to this idea, public protest is designed
to unleash a public debate, to draw the attention of the public to the grievances of the
actors in question, to create controversy where there was none, and to obtain the support of
the public for the actors’ concerns. Put differently, protest fulfils three essential functions
that may drive the dynamic relation between protest and electoral politics: they draw
attention to the public’s grievances andmay unleash a controversy (attention function); they
attribute political responsibility for (economic) disparities (attribution function); and they
can strengthen allies in the political system (spin function) (for a related discussion, see
Gillion & Soule 2018: 2ff)
Such a view of political conflict is most prominent in the agenda-setting literature,
and recent contributions from that tradition emphasise the power of protest to signal
discontent and raise the salience of certain issues in more institutionalised arenas (e.g.,
Vliegenthart et al. 2016). In addition, the pressure from below tends to strengthen the
opposition and other allies of the protesting groups in the political system, which may be
the main reason why opposition parties support or even create such protest in the first
place. The controversial public debates that result from the expansion of conflict by protest
mobilisation increase the legitimacy of speakers and allies of movements with journalists
and decision makers, who tend to closely follow the public debates (Gamson &Meyer 1996:
288). Wolfsfeld’s (1997: 47) ‘principle of political resonance’ formulates this relationship
in a concise way: challengers who succeed in producing events, which resonate with the
professional and political culture of important news media, can compete with much more
powerful adversaries.
For our argument, it is important that such protest actions may set in motion contentious
episodes involving a sequence of interactions between the government and its challengers
(see Kriesi et al. 2019; McAdam et al. 2001). In this sequence, the challengers’ protest
attributes responsibility for the problem at stake to the incumbents – that is, it serves as
a signal for the political dimension of the problem. This was also the case for the social
movements and protest campaigns that emerged in the context of the Great Recession:
they had a clear message, opposing austerity and calling for democratic renewal, which
emphasised the responsibility of both national and European elites for mismanaging
the economic crisis and for exacerbating problems of democratic representation (e.g.,
Altiparmakis & Lorenzini 2018; Della Porta 2015). Given their structural constraints,
incumbent parties have above all resorted to procedural concessions to accommodate the
pressure from the streets: changes in leadership, reshuffles of the cabinet composition,
calls for early elections or ceding responsibility to a caretaker government composed of
technocrats. The situation of governments in the countries that were hardest hit by the crisis
proved to be particularly uncomfortable in this respect. Not only were they exposed to
domestic pressure in the streets,but they also faced pressure from international stakeholders
who expected them to act responsibly and execute the measures deemed necessary by the
‘markets’.
C© 2019 European Consortium for Political Research
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Consequently, the interaction dynamics between protest and electoral politics seem
particularly closely coupled in a crisis context.A typical scenario for the interaction between
protest and electoral politics in the countriesmost severely hit by the crisismay look like this:
The discontented groups mobilise against austerity measures even before the next elections,
and in response to the protests, the incumbents make some procedural concessions. Yet,
the incumbents fail in satisfying the voters, who severely punish them in the first national
elections after the crisis. In these elections, the established opposition parties win office.
Once in charge, however, the new government is hardly able to adopt any other policy
than the previous government, given the economic constraints imposed on them. Such a
situation is likely to further boost protest in the streets, which emphasises the responsibility
of the government for the economic situation and increases electoral punishment in later
crisis elections. Partly because of the protests, the voters are bound to notice that the new
government is forced to take the same measures as its predecessors, whom they had voted
out of office, and they may resort to punishing the mainstream parties as a whole in the
following elections – by turning to new challengers or by exiting from the established
electoral channel altogether. The eventual result may be a profound destabilisation of the
national party system (Roberts 2017).
While case studies of countries in Southern Europe support this scenario (on Spain, see,
e.g.,Vidal 2018),we aim for an aggregate analysis and formulate two important expectations
about the impact of protest mobilisation on electoral punishment in the Great Recession.
First,while we do not expect a direct effect of protest on electoral punishment,we do expect
that protests play an important role in attributing responsibility for the economic decline
and the growing cross-national disparities to the national and European elites. Massive
protests should thus amplify the connections between economic misery and the losses of
governments in national elections. We suggest calling this the ‘signalling mechanism’ of
protest and,empirically,we expect to find that economic voting is stronger in contexts of high
protest mobilisation (‘signalling hypothesis’).
Second, protest mobilisation is expected to intensify the feeling among voters that
there is a more fundamental ‘crisis of representation’ as a change in government may
not result in a change of policy. Therefore, we expect that protest mobilisation may
act as an important trigger of the further destabilisation of European party systems by
highlighting that mainstream parties (both in opposition and in government) no longer fulfil
their representative functions and are, therefore, punished in national elections regardless
of whether they are in government or not (‘destabilisation hypothesis’). Note that both
expectations depend on the power of the economic vote in the first place – that is, if electoral
punishment is hardly related to economic developments, such as in less institutionalised and
highly volatile party systems, it is unlikely that protests may serve the signalling function
envisioned in our ideal-typical scenario.
Data and operationalisation
The empirical analysis is based on electoral outcomes and protest levels in 30 European
countries from 2000 to 2015.3 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to study
aggregate shifts in electoral results and protest mobilisation in such a large-N setting. The
analysis covers countries fromWestern andEasternEurope, considering differences in party
C© 2019 European Consortium for Political Research
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system institutionalisation and the general extent of the economic vote. The 16-year time
frame allows us to examine the relationship between electoral and protest politics during
the Great Recession of 2008–2015 and to compare it with the pattern from the pre-crisis
period of 2000–2008.
To this end, we combine two datasets. First, we use a novel and extensive dataset on
protest events in the 30 countries from January 2000 until December 2015. The dataset was
created using semi-automated content analysis of ten English-speaking international news
agencies. We first developed a strategy of automated selection of news reports on protest
events that enabled us to select the news documents that are most likely to report on protest
events.Afterwards,we relied on a large team of human coders to retrieve information about
protest events in each article (e.g., number of events and participants, action forms, issues
and actors). The action repertoire covered by our research mirrors the standard approach
in protest event analysis, ranging from petitions, strikes and demonstrative forms to more
confrontational and violent activities. Online Appendix A-1 explains how the dataset was
created in more detail and provides some evaluations of the quality of the data. In general,
the semi-automated tools introduced some biases in terms of country coverage or action
forms included in our dataset, but a careful evaluation of our tools and a comparison of
our procedure with data based on the coding of national news shows that our dataset is of
good quality (Kriesi et al. forthcoming). In total, our unique dataset includes 31,000 protest
events on a variety of different issues. For the analysis in this study we include protest on
public economic issues only – that is,protests about economic issues that concern the general
public and not only selected individuals or companies. This leaves us with around 9,200
protest events that are included in our main analysis, but we also performed some ‘placebo’
tests with other non-economic protest events (see below).
For our second dataset, we collected information about the election results from the
same 30 countries before and after the Great Recession. The dataset includes information
on the performance of political parties in the two national legislative elections prior to the
Great Recession and all elections that have taken place since then, up to and including
the 2015 Spanish election. In total, it includes 118 elections. Online Appendix A-2 lists all
elections covered and provides further information about the sources of the data. Note that
we include parties that received at least 3 per cent of the vote in any given election and won
representation in parliament. A list of all parties is also included in Online Appendix A-2.
In order tomake themeasures for electoral and protest politics as comparable as possible
we combine the two datasets and focus on electoral changes and protests in the same time
frame (i.e., in a given legislative period).To begin with,we calculate the level of electoral loss
of the prime minister’s party as the change in the vote share of that party between elections
at time t and t-1. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of this variable. It is noteworthy that,
according to this measure, the five elections with the largest loss for the incumbents are all
fromEastern Europe with the exception of theGreek 2012 election, indicating the relatively
high electoral volatility in Eastern European party systems.
Similarly, from our protest dataset we compute an indicator for the level of protest in
each legislative period.More precisely,we study the total number of reported protest events
for each legislative period, and we account for the differing length of the legislative periods
by dividing the number of protest events with the duration in months. This ‘weighted’
measure of the relative number of protest events allows us to compare the development of
C© 2019 European Consortium for Political Research
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protest over time in 30 different countries.4 As a robustness check, we repeat our analysis
with the number of protest participants (divided by the logged population size of each
country). Data for the number of participants is more susceptible to outliers as individual
large protest events may drive the results. Yet, the results are very similar (see Online
Appendix B-1). Table 1 shows the summary statistics for both the count of protest events
and protest participants by legislative period. In terms of the event count, the legislative
periods with the highest weighted amount of economic protest (above 500) are: Greece,
2009–2012; France, 2007–2012 and 2002–2007; Italy, 2008–2013; and the United Kingdom,
2005–2010. For our analysis, we combine the information about the weighted event count
for each legislative period with the data on electoral outcomes and standardise both
measures to make them more easily comparable.
To measure the change in economic conditions in a given country between the election
at time t-1 and t, we rely on three economic indicators that were especially pertinent during
the latest economic crisis: change in the unemployment rate; change in the gross domestic
product; and change in the level of government debt (as a percentage of GDP).5 These
measures refer to retrospective and objective assessments of the economy. To reduce the
complexity of our analysis, we follow Hernández and Kriesi (2016) and use factor analysis
to combine the three indicators. The results of the factor analysis are shown in Online
Appendix A-3. They indicate that all three variables load strongly on a single factor, and
therefore, we estimate a misery index based on the factor scores. This index is a single
measure of a country’s economic performance and it increases as economic conditions
worsen. It is useful for evaluating the impact of the economy on electoral and protest politics
because citizens are more likely to respond to general economic trends and not to the
evolution of specific macroeconomic indicators. Table 1 also shows the summary statistics
of this index and, as expected, the legislative periods with the highest change in economic
misery are all from the post-2008 period. They include: Ireland, 2007–2011; Iceland, 2007–
2009; Greece, 2009–2012; Spain, 2008–2011; and Latvia, 2006–2010.
Empirical findings
The drivers of electoral and protest politics in the Great Recession
Following the literature on economic voting, we start our analysis by assessing the
importance of the economic context on electoral losses and protest levels. We compare
the factors that drive economic voting and economic protest mobilisation during the 118
legislative periods included in our dataset.A descriptive analysis reveals that both electoral
losses and protests are positively correlated with economic misery. Consequently, we also
find that both the average electoral loss and average protests sharply increased in post-crisis
Europe. As Table 1 shows, the average electoral loss of the incumbent increased from 3.60
percentage points in the pre-crisis period to 8.41 and 7.75 percentage points in first-crisis and
later-crisis elections, respectively. At the same time, the average number of protest events
increased from around 83 in the pre-crisis period to around 147 in the first-crisis period,
while the average number of protesters increased from 733,742 in the pre-crisis period to
1,054,611 in the first-crisis period. A further look at the data with bivariate correlations
and scatter plots reveals that economic misery is correlated with both electoral volatility
C© 2019 European Consortium for Political Research
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and protests, but it already suggests that the electoral arena follows more closely the ups
and downs of the economic cycle (see Online Appendix A-4). Moreover, the relationship
between the economy and electoral and protest politics turns out to be significantly weaker
in the less institutionalised party systems in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe.
These patterns are confirmed by the regression analysis presented in Table 2. We
use simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with the electoral loss of the prime
minister’s party and the number of protest events in a given legislative period as dependent
variables in separate analyses.6 As expected, a larger change in economic misery is related
to larger electoral losses. According to model 1, a one standard deviation increase in misery
is associated with a 0.34 standard deviation increase in electoral loss of the incumbent,
which is equivalent to 3.14 percentage points.7 Turning to protest, we find a similar pattern:
a larger change in economic misery is related to a higher level of economic protests (model
2). This effect is a little smaller, but also significant: a one standard deviation increase in
misery is associated with a 0.32 standard deviation increase in the number of protests. This
is equivalent to an increase in protests by around 18.7 events per year or 27,000 people per
1 million inhabitants per year (see Online Appendix B-1).8
As expected, this relationship betweenmisery and electoral loss and protest, respectively,
becomes even stronger when we focus onWestern Europe exclusively.As models 5 and 6 in
Table 2 show, both the regression coefficient and the R2 increase significantly compared to
models 1 and 2, respectively. This confirms that the electoral and protest arena are more
closely associated with the ups and downs of the economy in Western Europe than in
Eastern Europe.
The results presented in Table 2 also suggest that timing matters for both electoral and
protest dynamics. To test this, we considered an interaction effect of economic misery and
the timing variable (models 3 and 4 for all countries; models 7 and 8 for Western Europe
only). The results are best interpreted with the help of Figure 1, which plots the marginal
effect of misery by election type. Figures 1a and 1b suggest that economic misery and
electoral loss becamemore closely correlated over time:a change in the prevailing economic
conditions was not associated with electoral losses in the pre-crisis period, but it had a
positivemarginal effect during the crisis. In later-crisis elections especially, citizens perceived
the worsening economic conditions as a failure of the incumbent parties and punished them
at the voting booth. In other words, as the crisis progressed, the fate of governments tended
to be increasingly tied to the economic performance of their country.Figures 1c and 1d show
the same relationship for protest. They indicate that a change in economic misery neither
predicted whether citizens took to the streets before the crisis nor whether they did so in
the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. However, we find a strong
positive effect of economic misery on the level of economic protest during later stages of
the economic crisis. This is well exemplified by the massive protests and electoral turmoil in
countries like Greece or Portugal, which only erupted after the first ‘crisis’ elections in 2009.
To test the robustness of these results, which suggest that the Great Recession affected
the electoral and the protest arena in a relatively similar way, we conducted several
additional analyses. First, we re-estimated the regressions with country-clustered standard
errors to account for a possible correlation of errors from the same country (Online
Appendix B-3). The results are very similar to the ones shown above, indicating that
our results are robust to possible country-level clusters. Second, given the relatively small
C© 2019 European Consortium for Political Research
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Figure 1. Averagemarginal effect of a change inmisery on electoral loss and protest by election type [Colour
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: The average marginal effects are calculated based on models 3, 4, 7 and 8 in Table 2, respectively. For
each period, they are obtained by calculating the marginal effect of misery for each observation and then
taking the average across all observations for a given period.
number of cases, we tested whether our results are driven by outliers in two different ways
(Online Appendix B-3): we estimated quantile (median) regression and robust regressions
to reduce the importance of outliers.9 Using these techniques, the coefficients for protest
become smaller, but they are still significant and generally support the patterns that we
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Table 3. The impact of economic misery and protest on electoral loss
All countries (n = 30) Western Europe (n = 20)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Electoral
loss
Electoral
loss
Electoral
loss
Electoral
loss
Electoral
loss
Electoral
loss
Misery 0.34*** 0.30** 0.30** 0.49*** 0.42*** 0.40***
(3.86) (3.27) (3.30) (6.74) (5.65) (5.35)
Protest 0.11 –0.05 0.14* 0.01
(1.24) (–0.41) (2.28) (0.16)
Misery * Protest 0.13+ 0.10*
(1.95) (2.19)
Constant 0.00 0.00 –0.04 –0.27*** –0.28*** –0.30***
(0.00) (0.00) (–0.47) (–3.90) (–4.15) (–4.51)
Observations 118 118 118 77 77 77
R2 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.38 0.42 0.45
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
found above. Finally, in the spirit of a ‘placebo’ test, we used the number of cultural and
political protests as the dependent variable (OnlineAppendix C-1).For these non-economic
protests, economic misery and the crisis did not systematically affect the number of events.
In other words, only economic protests are positively associated with misery, increasing our
confidence that the uncovered relationship betweenmisery and economic protests is, indeed,
meaningful.
Protest and the economic vote
As suggested above, both arenas are interwoven with national and international political
dynamics and there is reason to believe that protest politics and electoral politics are closely
related.Consequently,we try tomove beyond the search for equivalent relations and test the
importance of protest mobilisation as a signalling mechanism that may reinforce electoral
punishment. Again using OLS regression, we repeat the analysis from the first step with
electoral losses as the dependent variable, but we now include our measure of protests as
an independent variable. To test whether there is a signalling mechanism, we include an
interaction between protests and our economic misery indicator. Otherwise this analysis
mirrors the analysis from the first step.
Table 3 shows the results of this exercise. The analysis confirms that a change in misery
has a strong effect on the electoral performance of incumbents (see model 1). Looking
at results from all 30 European countries, however, the interaction effect of protest and
misery is only statistically significant at the 10 percent significance level (see model 3).
When we repeat the analysis for Western Europe only (see models 4–6), the results become
stronger: there is now a positive and clearly statistically significant interaction effect of
protest and economic misery. Following the recommendation of Brambor et al. (2006), we
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Figure 2. Average marginal effect of a change in misery on electoral loss across the range protest [Colour
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: The average marginal effects are calculated based on models 3 and 6 in Table 3, respectively.
plot the average marginal effect in Figure 2 to illustrate this interaction. The plot shows
how the average marginal effect of economic misery on the electoral loss of the incumbent
changes across the observed range of protest. It demonstrates that this effect varies over
the range of protest, but the interaction effect is only significant when we focus on Western
Europe (Figure 2b). In this region, a change in misery has only a small effect on electoral
punishment when protests are low, but as protests increase, the average marginal effect of
misery also increases. Protests thus seem to amplify the impact of an increase in economic
misery on the electoral performance of incumbents, supporting our expectations about the
signalling effect of protest in Western Europe.10 As theorised above, opposing austerity
and linking that opposition to a fundamental critique of representative democracy – ‘real
democracy now’ as the battle cry of the Indignados went – was key for the most recent
wave of protest in Southern Europe. For Eastern Europe, where party systems are less
institutionalised, Hernández and Kriesi (2016) already showed that voters are less likely
to punish governments for worsening economic conditions than in Western Europe.Hence,
and as outlined above, it is not surprising that we do not find a strong signalling effect of
protest on electoral punishment in Eastern Europe, either.11
Additional analyses shown in the Online Appendix suggest that this signalling effect of
protest is robust.When we use the number of protest participants instead of the number of
events to measure protest levels (Online Appendix B-1), the signalling effect is marginally
smaller but remains statistically significant. Quantile median and robust regression models
show that our results are again robust to potential outliers (Online Appendix B-3).
Moreover, there is no signalling effect for protests that address non-economic issues as
shown in Online Appendix C-1. We again treat this as a ‘placebo’ test, which indicates that
it is not any kind of protest that has an impact on economic voting. Only economic protests
act as a signal for economic discontent and attribute blame for misery to the government.
This is also supported by an analysis, in which we tested whether higher economic voting is
associated with higher economic protests afterwards (Online Appendix C-2).Generally, we
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find that the punishment of incumbents tends to dampen economic protests in the legislative
period after a given election.Althoughwe expect that the effect of elections on protestmight
be different in the short term (given that citizens sometimes express their dissatisfaction
with the electoral contest by protesting), we treat this as evidence indicating that economic
protests trigger the punishment of incumbents and not vice versa.
Protest and the decline of mainstream parties
These results give us reason to believe that the economic crisis and the resultingmobilisation
in the streets have had deeper consequences for political competition in Europe than the
short-term punishment of incumbents. Therefore, in the final step of our analysis, we turn to
a more careful analysis of whether the crisis has also accelerated the decline of mainstream
parties and how this decline is related to political contestation in the protest arena. To this
end, we move to the party level and analyse the electoral losses of all parties (and not
exclusively incumbents) – that is, we calculate the level of electoral loss for each individual
party as the change in its vote share between a given election at time t and t-1. Given our
results so far, we restrict our analysis to Western Europe only and study electoral results
from 77 elections in 20 Western countries from 2000 to 2015.
In order to analyse the impact of protest on the dynamics of party competition we
classify the parties in two ways. First, we code parties as mainstream versus non-mainstream
parties according to their party family, as indicated by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey:parties
from the conservative,Christian democratic, social democratic and liberal party families are
classified as mainstream, whereas parties from all other party families are classified as non-
mainstream. Second, we classify parties according to their left-right ideology: parties that
are social democratic, green or far left are classified as left parties, whereas all other parties
are classified as non-left parties.12
The summary statistics for each party family are shown in Table 4. On average,
mainstream parties lose 0.75 percentage points in an election during our period of study,
Table 4. Electoral losses by party type in Western Europe
Average by election type
Party type Mean
Standard
deviation Minimum Maximum
Pre-crisis
election
First-crisis
election
Later-crisis
election
Mainstream 0.75 5.80 –18.40 30.72 –0.01 1.73 1.25
In government 2.96 6.08 –15.40 30.72 1.40 3.97 4.98
In opposition –1.52 4.48 –18.40 9.41 –1.34 –1.28 –2.15
Non-mainstream –0.69 4.26 –25.56 16.89 0.04 –1.83 –0.87
Left –0.01 5.33 –25.56 30.72 –0.23 –0.57 0.92
Non-left 0.07 5.03 –18.40 24.16 0.16 0.38 –0.47
Note: The data shows the electoral loss of different types of parties – that is, the difference in the vote share
of parties between elections at times t and t+1. Positive values indicate a loss in vote share; negative values
indicate a gain.
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but there are important differences across time. In the pre-crisis period, mainstream and
non-mainstream parties, on average, hardly experienced electoral gains or losses. Yet, this
changed during the crisis: in the 20 first-crisis elections in Western Europe, mainstream
parties on average lost 1.73 percentage points, while they lost 1.25 percentage points in
later-crisis elections. At the same time, non-mainstream parties benefited from the crisis:
on average, they increased their vote share by 1.83 percentage points in first-crisis elections
and by 0.87 percentage points in later-crisis elections. The average vote share of left-wing
parties remained relatively stable across our period of study, but it changed from one period
to the other: the left gained votes in pre- and first-crisis elections, but lost votes in later-crisis
elections.
To assess the gains and losses of the different types of parties more systematically, we
again resort to OLS regressions, but we now use the electoral losses of individual parties as
our dependent variable. We use the same independent variables as in the previous steps of
our analysis, but following the literature on economic voting, we also include two dummy
variables that capture whether a party was in government, and whether the prime minister
was from that particular party during a given legislative period. In the baseline model we
then include a dummy variable for mainstream parties and test the differential effect of a
change in economic misery and protests on mainstream versus non-mainstream parties by
including an interaction effect with this dummy variable. Similarly, we repeat the analysis
and examine the differential effect of economic misery and protest punishment for left- and
right-wing parties in separate models.
The results of these analyses are shown in Table 5. Model 1 confirms our earlier finding
that governing parties are punished more consistently at polls than other parties, but in
general, there is no negative effect for mainstream parties. These parties are not losing
consistently during our period of study, shedding some doubt on the general thesis of the
long-term decline of mainstream parties. Yet, the results suggest that the electoral fortunes
of mainstream parties are related to the level of protest in a given legislative period.
The interaction effect between mainstream parties and protests is positive and statistically
significant, indicating that the electoral punishment of mainstream parties increases as
protests become larger. To interpret this interaction effect, it is useful to plot the marginal
effect of protest by party type (Figure 3). The results indicate that the marginal effect of
protest for non-mainstream parties is negative, while the effect is positive for mainstream
parties. Put differently, protests increase the electoral losses of mainstream parties, while
non-mainstream parties fare better in elections after such protests. As we expected, this
results in the fragmentation of the party system and highlights the need to integrate the
study of protest into analyses of party competition.
Model 2 in Table 5 goes one step further and investigates whether the signalling effect of
protest also holds at the level of individual parties, thereby contributing to the restructuring
of the party system in Western Europe. It includes a three-way interaction between party
type,protest and economicmisery to test whether the impact of a change in economicmisery
on the electoral support for mainstream parties is amplified by protest. To interpret the
results, we again visualise the interaction effect by showing the average marginal effect of a
change in misery on the electoral losses of different party types over the observed range of
protest (Figure 4). When the level of protest is low, misery has no significant effect on the
economic performance of different types of parties.Yet, as the level of protest increases, the
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Table 5. The effect of misery and protest on the electoral loss of different parties in Western Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Electoral loss Electoral loss Electoral loss Electoral loss
Prime minister (1 = yes) 0.21* 0.23* 0.22* 0.20+
(2.05) (2.27) (2.14) (1.94)
Government (1 = yes) 0.52*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.50***
(6.88) (6.65) (6.57) (6.73)
Protest –0.08** 0.01 0.01 0.06
(–2.65) (0.13) (0.35) (1.24)
Mainstream party (1 = yes) –0.08 –0.12*
(–1.28) (–1.97)
Mainstream party * Protest 0.22*** 0.00
(4.71) (0.01)
Misery –0.00 –0.10* –0.01 0.04
(–0.12) (–2.04) (–0.33) (0.80)
Protest * Misery –0.04 –0.04+
(–1.47) (–1.71)
Mainstream party * Misery 0.17**
(2.59)
Mainstream party * Protest * Misery 0.12**
(3.18)
Left party (1 = yes) 0.02 0.01
(0.27) (0.09)
Left party * Protest –0.00 –0.13+
(–0.01) (–1.65)
Left party * Misery –0.11
(–1.59)
Left party * Protest * Misery 0.10**
(2.67)
Constant –0.14*** –0.12** –0.18*** –0.18***
(–3.39) (–2.87) (–4.32) (–4.20)
Observations 548 548 548 548
R2 0.18 0.21 0.15 0.16
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
average marginal effect of misery becomes positive for mainstream parties but negative for
non-mainstreamparties.This suggests that the relationship between the prevailing economic
conditions and the punishment of mainstream parties is not direct. Instead, citizens aremore
likely to defect frommainstream parties when there is a relatively large amount of economic
protest, which, as we posit, politicises the fact that the economy is doing poorly.
Models 3 and 4 of Table 5 repeat this analysis, but we now distinguish between left-
wing parties and all other parties. The results indicate that there is only a weak interaction
C© 2019 European Consortium for Political Research
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Figure 3. Average marginal effect of protest on electoral loss of mainstream vs. non- [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
mainstream parties
Note: The average marginal effects are calculated based on model 1 in Table 5.
between protest politics and the fortunes of left-wing parties. The latter do not generally
benefit from protests – something that is also illustrated by the descriptive results shown in
Table 4 and the marginal effects plot (included in Appendix C-4).This questions the general
idea of a close alliance between social movements and parties from the left in Europe.13
Yet,when we include a three-way interaction between left-wing parties,misery and protests,
an interesting pattern emerges: generally left-wing parties somewhat gain during economic
downturns, but this effect ceases to exist as protest increases. In fact, the results in Online
Appendix C-4 show that left-wing parties only benefit from a worsening of economic misery
when there is little economic protest. Taken together,models 3 and 4 indicate that the effect
of protest did not systematically move Western European party systems in one direction or
the other in terms of the traditional left-right spectrum during the Great Recession. This
supports earlier findings by Bartels (2014), who could not find clear-cut ideological shifts to
the left or right in the electoral arena during the Great Recession.
Finally, these results are also supported by our robustness tests. First, when we consider
the number of participants instead of events, we also find that mainstream parties lose
more in elections that follow a high level of protest in a given legislative period (Online
Appendix B-1).Second, the analysis is also robust to outliers, as indicated by the results from
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across the range of protest [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: The average marginal effects are calculated based on model 2 in Table 5.
quantile median and robust regressions models (Online Appendix B-3). Third, the results
are very similar if we study relative losses, taking into account the differing vote shares of
the parties (Online Appendix B-4). Finally, the ‘placebo test’ in Online Appendix C-1 shows
that mainstream parties are not punished following non-economic protest. Overall, these
results suggest that economic protests tend to be an important factor that has driven the
destabilisation of Western European party systems during the Great Recession.
Conclusion
In the Great Recession, incumbents were heavily punished in the electoral arena.However,
this punishment was not limited to the electoral arena; instead, citizens also punished the
government by voicing their grievances in the street. By and large, our analyses show that
electoral losses and protest were both driven by the poor economic performance of a
given country, confirming the economic voting model. This relationship between economic
performance and economic voting as well as protests was particularly strong in later stages
of the crisis, as the economic fate of countries in Europe diverged and citizens mobilised
against governments in countries that remained mired in the economic stagnation.
Still, it is misleading to treat punishment in the electoral and protest dynamics as
independent from each other. The analyses in this article suggest that these protests were
coupled with electoral punishment in the sense that larger protests were also associated with
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stronger electoral punishment of incumbents.We present evidence that protests can amplify
the importance of economic conditions for electoral punishment – at least in the more
institutionalised party systems of Western Europe. By attributing responsibility, mobilising
citizens and channelling their grievances into the electoral arena, protest increases the
importance of economic conditions for the next general election. Thus, protest may be
an indicator of an emerging public sphere, which can make politicians responsible and
accountable especially in crisis situations. The ‘placebo test’ with non-economic protests
underlines that this effect is driven by economic protests that target public policies and
institutions.
Our analysis further suggests that this kind of signalling effect of protest is not only
limited to the punishment of incumbents, but it tends to extend to all mainstream parties:
during the crisis, as economic conditions worsened, citizens were more likely to defect from
mainstream parties when there was a relatively large amount of economic protest. The
beneficiaries of this destabilisation of the party system were non-mainstream parties. They
feed off the discontent that citizens voiced in the streets and were likely to win more votes
in the next election following large protests. In sum, our analyses point to a destabilising
effect of the Great Recession on political competition in Europe but this destabilisation
has not been resolved in one way or the other: the political system across Europe has not
systematically swung in one direction, as different parties have benefited in different regions.
Importantly, we do not observe a close connection between the electoral fortunes of the
political left and economic protests in the streets.
More research, however, is needed to further disentangle the complex relationship
between electoral behaviour and protests. In this article, we have taken an important
step by providing the first large-scale comparative study of the dynamics of protest and
electoral politics. Yet, we have only established aggregate empirical relations and suggested
a potential mechanism linking protest and electoral politics. Future research needs to
either zoom-in on specific contentious episodes or use an experimental set-up to properly
assess the mechanisms at work and to answer several open questions. How are protests
embedded into the electoral cycle? What kind of sequences can we observe between
objective economic indicators (as we studied them), protests and perceived grievances? Do
protests that occur shortly before an election have a greater impact than other protests?
How is the effect of protests moderated by the economic and political features of individual
countries? How can some parties ride protest waves while others get swept aside by them?
How closely – in terms of time – is the occurrence of protest related to the decline of some
parties and the rise of others? We hope that the findings of our study will encourage others
to tackle some of these questions in the future.
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Online Appendix
Additional supporting information may be found in the Online Appendix section at the end
of the article:
Table A-1: Average number of protest events and participants by country (monthly)
Table A-2: List of all elections covered
Table A-3: List of all parties included
Table A-4: Factor loadings
Table A-5: Predicted factor
Table A-6: Change in economic conditions by legislative period
Table A-7: Correlation matrix of key variables for 118 European elections and 77 Western
European elections
Figure A-1: Scatterplots of misery and electoral loss/protest
Figure A-2: Scatterplots of electoral loss and misery by election type
Figure A-3: Scatterplots of protest and misery by election type
Figure A-4: Scatterplots of electoral loss and misery by intensity of protest
Table B-1: The impact of economic misery and timing on electoral loss and protest (protest
participants)
TableB-2:The impact of economicmisery and protest on electoral loss (protest participants)
Table B-3: The effect of misery and protest on the electoral loss of different parties in
Western Europe (protest participants)
Table B-4: The impact of unemployment on electoral loss and protest
Table B-5: The impact of unemployment and protest on electoral loss
Table B-6: The effect of unemployment and protest on the electoral loss of different parties
in Western Europe
Table B-7: The impact of economic misery on electoral loss and protest with additional
control variables
Table B-8: The impact of economic misery, protest and additional variables on electoral loss
Table B-9: The impact of economic misery, timing and bailouts on electoral loss and protest
with country-clustered SEs
Table B-10: The impact of economic misery and protest on electoral loss with country-
clustered SEs
Table B-11: The effect of misery and protest on the electoral loss of different parties in
Western Europe with country-clustered SEs
Table B-12:The impact of economicmisery, timing and bailouts on electoral loss and protest
(quantile regression)
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Table B-13: The impact of economic misery and protest on electoral loss (quantile
regression)
Table B-14: Explaining the electoral loss of mainstream and left-wing parties in Western
Europe (quantile regression)
Table B-15:The impact of economicmisery, timing and bailouts on electoral loss and protest
(robust regression)
Table B-16: The impact of economic misery and protest on electoral loss (robust regression)
Table B-17: Explaining the electoral loss of mainstream and left-wing parties in Western
Europe (robust regression)
Table B-18: The effect of misery and protest on the relative electoral loss of different parties
in Western Europe
Table C-1: The impact of economic misery and timing on electoral loss and non-economic
protest
Table C-2: The impact of economic misery and non-economic protest on electoral loss
Table C-3: The effect of misery and non-economic protest on the electoral loss of different
parties in Western Europe
Table C-4: The impact of economic misery and electoral loss on protest
Figure C-1:Marginal effect of protest on electoral loss across the range of economic misery
Figure C-2: Average marginal effect of protest on electoral loss of mainstream vs.
nonmainstream parties across the range of economic misery
Figure C-3: Average marginal effect of protest on electoral loss of left vs. non-left parties
Figure C-4: Average marginal effect of misery on electoral loss of left vs. non-left parties
across the range of protest
Figure C-5: Average marginal effect of protest on electoral loss of left vs. non-left parties
across the range of economic misery
Notes
1. The data covers 27 EUmember states plus Iceland,Norway and Switzerland. It does not includeCroatia,
which joined the EU in 2013.
2. Thus, one needs to rely on other types of research designs: either focus on aggregate electoral outcomes
in a large N-setting (e.g., Dassonneville & Lewis-Beck 2014) or on a pooled design of several surveys
(e.g., Fraile & Lewis-Beck 2014) or structural equation modelling with individual-level panel data (e.g.,
Chzhen et al. 2014). Such designs indicate that the economic vote is stronger during an economic crisis.
3. The countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta,Norway,Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom.
4. The average number of protest events per month in a given country is shown in Online Appendix A-1.
5. Studies about economic voting also often include inflation.Given that inflationwas extremely lowduring
the period of our study, we excluded it from the analysis.
6. Note that in most models we refrain from including further control variables due to the small amount
of observations in our aggregate dataset. In additional analyses we also included several other control
variables, which did not alter the results.
7. To illustrate the magnitude of this change, Table A-5 in the Online Appendix lists all legislative periods
by the associated change in misery. A one-standard deviation change is roughly equal to moving from
France’s pre-crisis election of 2002–2007 to its first crisis election in 2007–2012, implying a difference
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in the change of unemployment by 1.2 percentage points, a difference in the change of gross domestic
product (GDP) by roughly 15 percentage points and a difference in the increase in government debt (to
GDP) by roughly 17 percentage points.
8. As robustness checks, we also re-estimated the analysis with unemployment instead of the misery index
as the key independent variable. The results are very similar to the results shown in the main analysis
(see Online Appendix B-1): a one standard deviation increase in unemployment (which is equivalent
to an increase in unemployment by 3.8 percentage points) is associated with a 0.34 standard deviation
increase in the electoral loss of the incumbent and a 0.21 increase in protest. In substantive terms, this is
equal to an electoral loss of 3.14 percentage points and an increase in protest by roughly 20,000 people
per million inhabitants and year.
9. We also checked for influential cases based on the scatter plots presented inOnlineAppendix A-4.Most
importantly, we re-estimated all analyses excluding the Greek elections from May 2012, which saw the
perfect storm of skyrocketing economic misery, high protest and extreme electoral punishment. Note
that the substantive results reported in the main text are not affected by this choice.
10. This is also indicated when plottingmisery and electoral loss separately for low and high levels of protest
(Figure A-4 in the Online Appendix).
11. To fully interpret the signalling effect of protest, we also plotted the average marginal effect of protest
conditioned by economic misery, following the recommendations by Berry et al. (2012). The resulting
plot shows that the signalling effect of protests is not about protest per se, but that it is about the
amplification of economic misery.
12. In total,our dataset includes 548 observations:276 observations formainstreamparties,272 observations
for non-mainstream parties, 296 observations for left parties and 252 observations for non-left parties.
13. We do not find that protests have a statistically significant effect on the electoral fortune of only far left
parties, either.
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